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Abstract 
This study tested which of two crucial mechanisms of working memory (WM): attention control, 
consisting of focusing attention on the proper task-set as well as blocking distraction, and the ac- 
tive buffer capacity, related to the number of chunks that can be actively maintained, plays a more 
important role in WM’s contribution to fluid intelligence. In the first study, the antisaccade task 
was used, the standard measure of attention control, in a modified variant which resulted in 
scores less sensitive to individual differences in the active buffer capacity, in comparison to the 
standard variant. In effect, attention control became a weak predictor of Gf, explaining less than 
one third of its variance accounted for by the capacity. In the second study, a variant of another 
attention control test, the Stroop task, was applied, which minimized the load on capacity, and no 
significant contribution of this task to Gf was found. Thus, when contribution of control and capac- 
ity were unconfounded, attention control mechanisms of WM contributed to fluid intelligence to a 
lesser extent than did the mechanisms related to the active buffer of WM. 
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1. Introduction 
For over thirty years, significant correlations between attention, working memory (WM), and higher-level cog- 
nition have been found (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; Hunt, 1980; Kyllonen & Christal, 1990). This data have 
inspired researchers to identify various WM mechanisms presumably underlying general fluid intelligence (Gf, 
fluid ability, fluid reasoning, reasoning ability). Recently, two such theories have gained considerable influence 
in WM and Gf literature. The executive-attention theory explains differences in reasoning in terms of attention 
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control capability, predicting that the advantage of more intelligent people stems from their better focus on rele- 
vant information as well as from their more effective blocking of distraction in WM operation (Engle & Kane, 
2004; Kane & Engle, 2002). The competing storage-capacity theory assumes that more successful reasoning re- 
lies on the larger scope or size or capacity of the active buffer of WM (often called short-term memory buffer; 
STM), which is defined as the number of items (Cowan, 2001) or items’ bindings (Oberauer, Süß, Wilhelm, & 
Sander, 2007) that one can actively and accessibly maintain in parallel within WM. 
Both approaches to Gf agree that active maintenance of information for the purpose of ongoing processing 
(i.e., WM) is crucial for effective fluid reasoning. What distinguishes the executive-attention approach is the be- 
lief that WM and reasoning depend on the quality (e.g., strength, task relevance, etc.) of maintenance of infor- 
mation (be it a current goal, an S-R mapping, a target item, or a key context), which is crucial under conditions 
of interference and response competition, but that these abilities are not related to the quantity of actively main- 
tained chunks. Moreover, it is important for the executive-attention theory that the effective focusing of attention 
requires also the successful blocking of distractors (e.g., irrelevant stimuli or response tendencies), in order to 
prevent inevitable attentional capture. So, assuming that WM mechanism consists of the STM component with 
executive attention controlling its contents, according to this theory, the variance in higher-level cognition re- 
flects primarily the executive attention but not the STM component. Consequently, theories focusing on the ac- 
tive buffer capacity are not meant to allow for predictions or data accommodated by the executive-attention 
view (Kane & Engle, 2002: p. 638). In contrast, storage-capacity theories predict that controlling attention dur- 
ing reasoning tasks yields not so much impact for reasoning scores, whereas it is crucial for Gf to maintain in 
WM as many items as possible, because it may determine how complex relations can be constructed from 
working memory items, e.g., (Halford, Cowan, & Andrews, 2007; Oberauer, Süß, Wilhelm, & Sander, 2007). 
Indeed, various measures of the active buffer capacity strongly predict scores on Gf tests, e.g., (Chuderski, 
Taraday, Nęcka, & Smoleń, 2012; Martinez et al., 2011; Oberauer, Schulze, Wilhelm, & Süβ, 2005; Süβ, Ob- 
erauer, Wittmann, Wilhelm, & Schultze, 2002). However, the studies which aimed to support the contribution of 
attention control to Gf seem to be less conclusive, as often the respective correlations are neglible, e.g., (Buehn- 
er, Krumm, & Pick, 2005; Chuderski et al., 2012; Friedman et al., 2006; Martinez et al., 2011), or the results are 
mixed, e.g., (Salthouse, 2005). In order to provide more data on how well attention control versus the active 
buffer capacity actually predict fluid intelligence, in this paper I evaluate the relationship between Gf and two 
tests of attention control, that is, the antisaccade (Study 1) and Stroop tasks (Study 2), which have borne most of 
support for the executive-attention approach to Gf, while controlling statistically for individual STM. 
Early suggestions on the links between attention control and intelligence came from latent variable studies 
(Conway, Cowan, Bunting, Therriault, & Minkoff, 2002; Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway, 1999; Kane et 
al., 2004) which compared STM tasks involving only storage to dual tasks requiring both storage and processing 
(i.e., complex span tasks intended to tap attention control). In these studies, the variables reflecting control cor- 
related with Gf more strongly than did the storage variables. However, there was no consistency in defining at-
tentional control, as in some studies, e.g., (Kane et al., 2004) the control variable loaded scores on both STM 
and complex span tasks, while in other studies (Conway et al., 2002; Engle et al., 1999) a variable defined in 
such a way was meant to reflect storage, while attention control was equated only to residual variance in com- 
plex spans. In fact, when in the latter studies the control variable was recalculated to reflect all tasks, it yielded 
similar Gf correlations as the residual variable (Kane et al., 2004: see their Footnote 3). 
As any valid research on executive processing requires that its indices must not reflect general performance, 
but instead should rely on subtracting conditions requiring control from some baseline performance (as in the 
cases of switching or dual-task costs, interference effects, etc.), the fact that a general WM factor correlates with 
Gf supports no specific hypothesis on executive mechanisms underlying WM-Gf. Moreover, Colom, Abad, Re- 
bollo and Shih (2005) reanalysed data from Kane et al. (2004) and found that a higher-level complex span factor 
(based on respective verbal and spatial primary factors) was a worse predictor of Gf than a higher-level STM 
factor. In a meta-analysis of latent variable studies on WM and Gf, Unsworth and Engle (2007a) showed that 
scores on STM tasks calculated more appropriately (i.e., using proportional scores instead of absolute ones) 
represent virtually the same portion of Gf variance as do complex spans. In another metaanalysis, Colom, Shih, 
Flores-Mendosa, and Quiroga (2006) noted that the residual complex-span variance is unstable and does not 
predict reasoning. Finally, it is not clear whether complex span tasks do measure attention control (for alterna- 
tive explanations see Barrouillet, Bernardin, & Camos, 2004; Lustig, May, Hasher, 2001; Lewandowsky, Geiger, 
Morrell, & Oberauer, 2010; Unsworth & Engle, 2007b), while the interpretation of simpler STM tasks in terms 
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of storage capacity is more unequivocal see (Brady, Konkle, & Alvarez, 2011; Fukuda, Awh, & Vogel, 2010; 
Rouder, Morey, Morey, & Cowan, 2011). From this perspective, results from complex span tasks do not seem to 
prove that it is attention control capability that determines variation in reasoning. 
More important arguments for the role of attention control in intelligence rely on the results of comparison of 
performance on diverse attention control tests between participants from the lowest and the highest quartile of a 
complex span distribution (for review see Engle & Kane, 2004). Example studies demonstrated lower error rates 
of high-span people in the antisaccade task (Unsworth, Shrock, & Engle, 2004), in the flanker task (Heitz & En- 
gle, 2007), and in incongruent trials of the high-proportion-congruent version of the Stroop task (Kane & Engle, 
2003). Other instances included their less frequent lapses of attention in a psychomotor vigilance task (Unsworth 
et al., 2010) and in a dichotic listening task (Colflesh & Conway, 2007). However, from the fact that (a) atten- 
tion control is related to complex spans, and (b) they are related to fluid intelligence, it does not necessarily fol- 
low that (c) attention control should be related to Gf (especially when only quartiles are examined). Better atten- 
tion control may indeed be involved in the performance of high-span people e.g., (Fukuda & Vogel, 2011; Un- 
sworth & Spillers, 2010; Vogel, McCollough, & Machizawa, 2005), but factors other than control (e.g., the ac- 
tive buffer capacity) may (also) drive complex spans’ relation to Gf. For example, recent studies have shown 
that complex spans are statistically identical to memory updating (Schmiedek, Hildebrandt, Lövdén, Wilhelm, & 
Lindenberger, 2009), that memory updating is identical to STM tasks (Chuderski et al., 2012; Martinez et al., 
2011), and, finally, that complex spans are identical to STM tasks (Martinez et al., 2011). 
Apart from studies based on extreme complex-span quartiles, Unsworth and colleagues (Unsworth, Redick, 
Lakey, & Young, 2009; Unsworth & Spillers, 2010; Unsworth, Spillers, & Brewer, 2009) have recently ana- 
lysed correlations between attention control tasks and Gf tests in full samples. In particular, Unsworth and Spil- 
lers (2010) partitioned the explained Gf variance into parts predicted separately by latent variables reflecting 
complex spans, long-term memory (LTM), and attention control, the latter measured with the antisaccade, 
Stroop, flanker, and vigilance tasks, as well as identified parts shared by respective pairs of factors and by all 
factors. As much as 13% out of 32% of explained variance was shared by the three factors, and another 12% 
was unique to complex spans, LTM, or their interaction. This fact means that no more than 7% of Gf variance 
can be unequivocally assigned to attention control (the identical value was estimated by Schweizer, 2010)—a 
value suprisingly small if this factor is presumed to be the primary mechanism underlying Gf. 
Generally, in three studies by Unsworth, mean raw correlations between scores on specific attention control 
tasks and three Gf tests were weak. The mean r in the case of the antisaccade task equaled .13, in the case of the 
Stroop task it reached .11, in the case of the flankers it was .14, and, finally, the vigilance task yielded r = 14. 
These values are much lower than raw correlations usually observed between Gf tests and simple STM scores 
(e.g., the mean r = .32, for 29 correlations, in three comparable recent studies, Chuderski et al., 2012; Colom et 
al., 2008; Martinez et al., 2011). 
Moreover, in light of the prevalent suggestions that STM can indeed be very limited (i.e., to three or four 
items on average, see Cowan et al., 2011; Daavelaar, Goshen-Gottstein, Ashkenazi, Haarmann, & Usher, 2005; 
Luck & Vogel, 1997; Vogel & Machizawa, 2004), it seems probable that scores on attention control tasks used 
to date were influenced by individual STM. The maintenance of task instructions, like “look away from the 
flashing point” in the antisaccade task, or “say a color, not a word” in the Stroop task, or S-R mappings, like “if 
blue color then press Z”, might be very difficult for a substantial part of the population below the mean capacity, 
that is, for those who can maintain only few items in their active buffer, even if no distraction is involved.  
Moreover, if distraction indeed impaired maintenance, even salient distractors need not immediately capture all 
STM (which is an implicit assumption of the executive-attention view), but they may gradually leak into it, 
crowding out task-relevant chunks one by one. Due to distraction, less capacious persons may lose all the in- 
formation for the task, while more capacious ones can handle both that information and the distractors. 
Cowan et al. (2006) have tested this speculation and showed that attention control and STM share substantial 
amount of variance. These results are consistent with an fMRI study indicating that encoding of the goal of the pend-
ing antisaccade is supported by the high gamma band located in the intraparietal sulcus (Van Der Werf, Jensen, Fries, 
& Medendorp, 2008), a brain area found to support the active buffer (Cowan et al., 2011; Todd & Marois, 2004). 
Goals of the Present Study 
For all the aforementioned reasons, the evaluation of the actual relationships between fluid reasoning and two 
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crucial mechanisms of WM: its active buffer and its attention control, the latter reflected by scores on its most 
widely used tests (i.e., the antisaccade and Stroop-like tasks), seems to be a very important research goal. In 
light of findings on the large amount of variance shared between STM measures and the control of attention, the 
proper fulfillment of this goal should require 1) the design of attention control tasks that would be minimally in- 
fluenced by individual differences in STM as well as 2) statistical control for these differences. 
Below, two studies serving this goal are reported. Novel versions of the attention control tasks were used, 
which seemed to substantially decrease the influence of storage mechanisms on performance, and it was tested 
whether such purer indices of executive attention ability are or are not important contributors to fluid reasoning 
after the variance in STM—estimated as a number of items that can be maintained in specially designed STM 
tasks—is partialled out. 
2. Study 1 
In Study 1, it was aimed to verify that the antisaccade task was sensitive to the differences in individual capacity, 
and whether after decreasing this sensitivity it would still be an important predictor of fluid intelligence, or not. 
The opposite hypothesis, assuming that the STM task requires attention control, seems less likely. Firstly, de- 
tailed analysis of this task does not reveal any important sources for interference or distraction. Also, the STM 
task used was self-paced, so adequate breaks most likely helped participants to avoid most of interference from 
previous trials. Secondly, Chuderski, Andrelczyk, and Smolen (2013) demonstrated that the distribution of indi- 
vidual capacity observed in this task (as well as several other effects related to capacity differences) can be pre- 
cisely replicated by a computational model which included only storage mechanisms (fast oscillations reflecting 
the gamma band), but no control mechanisms. 
As it is not possible to eliminate from the antisaccade task the storage requirements (i.e., the instruction must 
be maintained throughout the task, as is implicated by neuroimaging research; Van Der Werf et al., 2008), the 
opposite logic was adopted and it was tried to substantially increase this task’s load on storage mechanisms. It 
was assumed that when most participants' buffer was heavily loaded, the differences in the buffer capacity 
would less influence their performance on the task, and its variance shared with Gf would primarily reflect the 
differences in effectiveness of attentional control over the distraction and interference related to prepotent pro- 
saccadic response tendency. The diminished sensitivity to storage of the modified version should result in much 
weaker correlations between the control and STM tasks, and a smaller amount of Gf variance they can jointly 
account for, compared to the performance on the standard version. 
2.1. Method 
Participants. There were 278 participants (166 females, M = 23.2 years, SD = 4.2, range 17 - 46). The partici- 
pants were randomly assigned to two groups: the standard antisaccade task group, called the “low-load group”—138 
people, and the modified task group, called the “high-load group”—140 people. Each participant was paid the 
equivalent of about 6 EUR. All participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision, they were instructed 
to take the most comfortable sitting position during the experiment, they completed WM and Gf tests in groups 
of two to five people, and during the computerized task they were equipped with headphones. 
Materials and procedure. The standard version of the antisaccade task consisted of 18 training and 40 test 
antisaccade trials. Each test trial consisted of four events. First, a cue was presented for 1.5 s, reminding partici- 
pants that a target would be presented precisely in the middle of the opposite side to the flashing square. Next, a 
fixation point was presented at the center of the screen for 1 - 9 s. Then, a rapidly flashing black square (3 cm in 
size) was shown on the left or right side of the screen, about 16 cm from the fixation point, for 150 ms. Finally, a 
small dark gray arrow (0.6 cm long), pointing left, down, or right, was presented in the location opposite the 
square for only 150 ms and was then replaced by a mask. The visual angle from both the square and the arrow to 
the fixation point was approximately 14˚. The task was to look away from the flashing square, to detect the di- 
rection of the arrow, and to press the arrow key matching the stimulus arrow. The trials were self-paced. A de- 
pendent variable was accuracy. 
The modification of the standard version was that the arrows could be presented not only in the middle of the 
side opposite to the flashing square, but also in the top or bottom part of this side. There were 30, 10, and 10 tri- 
als of each type, respectively. The cues presented before the two latter types of trials informed participants that 
they should look precisely at the top/bottom corner of the opposite side. Apart from that, the modified version 
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was identical to the standard one. The former was expected to impose a greater load on WM storage, because it 
required the maintenance not only of the instruction “look away from the square”, but also of a precise location 
that should be looked at (top/middle/bottom). Importantly, accuracy from only the 30 “middle” trials was taken 
as a dependent variable in the modified version, the same as in the standard version, so both scores reflected 
comparable trials. The “top”/“bottom” trials were only introduced to justify the need for active maintenance of 
the target location, thus increasing WM load, and were not analysed further. 
The active buffer capacity was screened with a modified change detection paradigm (Luck & Vogel, 1997; 
Rouder et al., 2011). Each of the 90 trials of the task consisted of a virtual, four by four array filled with five, six, 
or seven stimuli (i.e., only some cells in the array were filled). The stimuli were ten Greek symbols (e.g., α, β, χ, 
and so on), each approximately 2 × 2 cm in size. The array was presented on the screen for a time equal to the 
number of its items multiplied by 400 ms, and then covered for 1.2 s by a black square mask. In a random half 
of trials, a second array identical to the first one was presented next, while in the remaining trials the first and 
second arrays differed by exactly one item at one position. If they differed, then the new item was highlighted by 
a square red border. If they were identical, a random item was highlighted. The task was to press one of two re- 
sponse keys depending on whether the highlighted item differed or not in two arrays. The second array was 
shown until a response was given or 4 s elapsed. The trials were self-paced. 
The score on this task is the estimated sheer capacity of the active buffer (Cowan, 2001), based on the propor- 
tion of hits (H, correct responses for arrays with one item changed) and the proportion of false alarms (FA, in- 
correct responses for unchanged arrays). The capacity is estimated to be k items (out of N items of a WM load), 
on the assumption that a participant produces a correct hit or avoids a false alarm only if a cued item is trans- 
ferred to his or her buffer (with the k/N chance). If a non-transferred item is cued, then a participant guesses the 
answer. In consequence, the formula k = N × (H – FA) evaluates the score on the task for each N. The total score 
on this task was a mean from three values of k (i.e., for Ns = 5, 6, and 7). 
Fluid reasoning was assessed with two tests applied after the computerized tasks. Raven’s APM test (Raven, 
Court, & Raven, 1983) consists of 36 items that include a three-by-three matrix of figural patterns which is 
missing the bottom-right pattern, and eight response options which are the patterns which can potentially match 
a missing one. The participant’s task is to discover the rules that govern the patterns and choose the one and only 
response option. A novel analogy test (Orzechowski & Chuderski, 2007) included figural analogies in the form 
“A is to B as C is to X”, where A, B, and C are types of figures, A is related to B according to two, three, four, 
or five latent rules (e.g., symmetry, rotation, change in size, color, thickness, number of objects, etc.), and X is 
an empty space. The task is to choose one figure from four that relates to figure C, as B relates to A. Responses 
were filled in the answer sheet. The reasoning score (Gf) was calculated as the mean of z-scores of the total 
number of correctly solved items within 40 min in Raven’s and 30 min in Analogies. 
2.2. Results 
Descriptive statistics and reliabilities for all DVs as well as the matrix of correlations among them are presented 
in Table 1. Accuracy in the antisaccade task was significantly lower in the high-load group than in the low-load 
group, t(276) = 3.44, p < .001, d = .40. No other score differentiated the groups, ps > .35. Most importantly, the 
correlation between the antisaccade score and k value was weaker (Δr = .117) in the high-load group than in the 
low-load group, t(276) = 1.56, p = .060, d = 1.46, indicating that the manipulation with load was effective to 
considerable extent. 
Next, the regression analyses were calculated, and the Gf variance was partitioned separately for each group 
see (Chuah & Maybery, 1999; Cowan et al., 2005). In the high-load group, single-predictor regressions yielded, 
βANTISACCADE = .317, t(138) = 3.93, p < .001, R2 = .101, and βK = .449, t(138) = 5.91, p < .001, R2 = .202, while a 
double-predictor analysis yielded βANTISACCADE = .210, t(137) = 2.72, p = .007, βK = .392, t(137) = 5.07, p < .001, 
R2 = .243. In the low-load group, the respective values for single-predictor regressions were βANTISACCADE = .521, 
t(136) = 7.11, p < .001, R2 = .271, and βK = .431, t(136) = 5.57, p < .001, R2 = .186, while a double-predictor 
analysis provided βANTISACCADE = .416, t(135) = 5.45, p < .001, βK = .269, t(135) = 3.52, p < .001, R2 = .333. The 
βANTISACCADE value was significantly lower in the high-load than in the low-load group in both single-predictor 
and double-predictor regression, ts(276) = 2.75, ps = .003., ds = 2.73. 
In consequence, the variance partitioning analysis gave substantially different results in each group. In the 
high-load group, only 4.1% of Gf variance was uniquely accounted for by the antisaccade score, as much as 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics, reliabilities and correlation matrix for measures used in Study 1.                          
Variable 
Measure 
1 2 3 4 5 
Antisaccade—high load –     
Antisaccade—low load – –    
k Value .24 .39 –   
Raven .33 .47 .41 –  
Analogies .27 .50 .38 .65 – 
Mean .40 .47 3.43 21.66 23.34 
SD .17 .19 1.23 6.56 6.34 
Range .10 - .87 .02 - .90 0 - 5.88 1 - 35 3 - 36 
Skew .35 .13 −.55 −.35 −.57 
Kurtosis −.16 −.21 .09 −.09 .16 
Reliability .82 .87 .86 .85 .83 
Note: N = 278. All correlations were significant on at least p = .004 level. Reliability = Cronbach’s alpha. 
 
14.2% was uniquely accounted for by the k value, and the remaining 6.0% was explained by both variables to- 
gether. In the low-load group, these parts were 14.7%, 6.2%, and 12.4%, respectively. 
2.3. Discussion 
The manipulation considering the load imposed on active maintenance resulted in the fact that the performance 
in the more highly loading task correlated less strongly with k value than in the standard antisaccade task, and 
this fact indicates that in the former condition the individual buffer capacity influenced the accuracy of antisac- 
cades to a lesser extent. As a result, the pattern of contributions of the active buffer capacity and the control of 
attention to intelligence substantially changed. Contrary to the low-load group, in the high-load group the active 
buffer capacity was the primary contributor to Gf, while attention control univocally explained only 4% of Gf 
variance. The amount of Gf variance shared by both constructs decreased from 12.4% in the low-load group to 6% 
in the high-load group. That observation supports the interpretation that this variance was shared due to common 
maintenance requirements instead of the common involvement of attention control. On the basis of the execu- 
tive-attention theory it could be argued that the modified antisaccade task required an even larger amount of 
control due to the need to switch between three target locations, but in fact that did not result in its stronger pre- 
dictory power with regard to Gf score. 
All the above results suggest that the antisaccade task is a predictor of fluid intelligence in part because its 
performance substantially covaries with individual capacity of the active buffer. When the task was changed in 
such a way that its scores were less sensitive to the individual differences in STM, its contribution to Gf was 
much weaker than that of STM, making the latter the primary predictor of Gf. The part of Gf variance that is 
uniquely accounted for by the antisaccade task does not allow attention control as a factor underlying Gf to be 
decisively ruled out, however maybe its actual role in the explanation of fluid intelligence have been overesti- 
mated. 
3. Study 2 
According to the executive-attention theory, the Stroop task involves a great deal of attention control when it is 
applied in the high-proportion-congruent version, that is, when words presented in a non-matching color are rel- 
atively rare in a sequence. In such conditions, as often both reading words and naming colors lead to the same 
response, stimuli do not exogenously “remind” participants that words should not be read, so they have to en- 
dogenously focus their attention on the proper task. Kane and Engle (2003) showed that people with high-spans 
commit less errors than those with low-span (extreme quartiles) in such a condition, but this difference disap- 
pears when incongruent trials are frequent. In the latter condition, however, high-spans responded faster, pre- 
sumably because it took them shorter to resolve conflicts between reading and naming. 
However, to the author’s knowledge, this prediction (i.e., contrasting the high- and low-proportion-congruent 
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versions) has not been tested on a full sample and with regard to fluid intelligence. Kane and Engle (2002) cite 
an unpublished study by Kane, Sanchez, and Engle (1999), who observed r = −.49 between a single Gf measure 
and Stroop interference in the high-proportion-congruent version, but they did not test if such a correlation does 
also appear (or does not) in the alternative version. In a published study, Unsworth and Spillers (2010), using 33% 
of incongruent trials, found weak and insignificant correlations (rs = .10 - .12) between the latency interference 
effect and three Gf measures (for a similar result, see also Friedman et al., 2006). Moreover, Unsworth and 
Spillers’ task does not seem sheer enough, because it imposed a certain load on WM, as apart from the main- 
tenance of an instruction, the participants had to remember the arbitrary associations between colors and respec- 
tive response keys. 
In this study, a low-loading variant of the 75%-congruent color-word task was applied to one group of partici- 
pants, while the other group did the analogous variant of the 25%-congruent color-word task. It was intended to 
test if the correlation between Gf and accuracy interference in the former group was significant and significantly 
stronger than in the latter group. Such a result would indicate that specifically endogenous attention control, and 
not the Stroop performance in general, contributes to fluid intelligence. Crucially, unlike in the antisaccade task, 
within the Stroop paradigm it was possible to directly minimize related WM load, by presenting the color-key 
associations at the bottom of screen for the whole duration of the task. 
3.1. Method 
Participants. There were 297 participants (180 females, M age = 22.6 years, SD age = 3.2, range 15 - 46). The 
participants were randomly assigned to two groups (“the 75%-congruent group”—152 people, “the 25%-con- 
gruent group”—145 people). Data from four other participants was discarded due to their very low accuracy in 
the incongruent condition (all four Ms < .5). The reward and testing conditions were the same as in Study 1. 
Materials and procedure. The stimuli in the color-word task (MacLeod, 1991) were four capital Polish 
words (approx. 5 cm × 2 cm in size) naming the colors red, green, blue, and black. Each word could be dis-
played in any of the four ink colors. In congruent stimuli the meaning of the word and the color of the ink were 
the same. In incongruent stimuli the former differed from the latter. Trials lasted until a response was given, or 
for a maximum of 3 s. The instruction was to avoid reading a word and to press a response key that was assigned 
to a presented color. There were 90 congruent and 30 incongruent trials presented in the 75%-congruent group, 
while 30 congruent and 90 incongruent trials were shown in the 25%-congruent group. The accuracy (interfe- 
rence) effect was the difference between proportion correct in congruent versus incongruent trials. It showed 
how many more errors (in terms of their proportion) participants commited in the conflict trials in comparison to 
the baseline. Analogously, the latency (interference) effect was the difference between the mean RT of correct 
responses in incongruent versus congruent trials (i.e., how much longer it took participants to resolve conflicts). 
Because individual differences in elementary cognitive tasks are often related to the tail of latency distribution 
(Coyle, 2003), no trimming procedure was applied to latencies in order to amplify any possible correlations. The 
STM task and intelligence tests were the same as in Study 1. 
3.2. Results 
All data are presented in Table 2. As latency interference effects did not correlate significantly with Gf in any 
group (both rs < |.05|), and had low reliability (around .5), I analysed only accuracy effects. 
 Both accuracy and latency effects in the 25%-congruent group were approximately four times lower com- 
pared to the 75%-congruent group, t(295) = 6.28, p < .001, d = 7.74, and t(295) = 10.62, p < .001, d = 1.24, re- 
spectively. This indicates that the former condition was relatively easy and might not involve substantial atten- 
tion control, while the interference effects in the latter condition were comparable to other studies e.g., (Kane & 
Engle, 2003; Unsworth & Spillers, 2010) and indicated increased difficulty for the attentional system. In each 
group, both effects positively and significantly correlated, suggesting no speed-accuracy trade-off. In no group 
did these effects significantly correlate with the k value (all ps > .13). 
In order to partition the Gf variance, a couple of regression analyses were calculated. In the 75%-congruent 
group, single-predictor regressions yielded βSTROOP = −.160, t(150) = 1.98, p = .050, R2 = .025, and βK = .502, 
t(150) = 7.11, p < .001, R2 = .252, while a double-predictor analysis yielded βSTROOP = −.099, t(150) = 1.40, p 
= .163, βK = .490, t(150) = 6.91, p < .001, and R2 = .262. In the 25%-congruent group, the results were βSTROOP = −.014, 
t(143) = .16, and βK = .332, t(143) = 4.20, p < .001, R2 = .110. So, the Stroop effect was an expected but  
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics, reliabilities and correlation matrix for measures used in Study 2.                         
Variable 
Measure 
1 2 3 4 5 
Stroop 75% congruent –     
Stroop 75% congruent – –    
k Value −.12 −.02 –   
Raven −.15 −.02 .35 –  
Analogies −.13 .00 .41 .66 – 
Mean .08 .02 3.21 22.40 24.15 
SD .09 .07 1.31 6.01 5.97 
Range −.11 - .33 −.23 - .29 0 - 5.88 5 - 35 3 - 36 
Skew 1.01 .16 −.32 −.36 −.45 
Kurtosis .91 3.42 −.36 −.09 −.21 
Reliability .88 .90 .86 .85 .83 
Note: N = 297. Correlations significant at p < .05 level were the ones stronger than r = |.16|. Reliability = Cronbach’s alpha. 
 
weak predictor of Gf only in the 75%-congruent condition. 
Gf variance partitioning in the 75%-congruent group indicated that an insignificant 1.0% of this variance was 
uniquely accounted for by the Stroop effect, another 1.5% was predicted by both the Stroop and k value together, 
and as much as 23.7% was uniquely accounted for by the k value. 
3.3. Discussion 
The present data is consistent with Kane and Engle’s (2003) hypothesis predicting that the increased proportion 
of congruent trials will amplify the link between the Stroop effect and Gf. However, after keeping the load on 
WM low by attenuating the need to maintain the S-R mappings in WM (as they were presented onscreen), this 
correlation was weak and only marginally significant (anyway, it closely matched results of Unsworth & Spil- 
lers, 2010). The high-proportion-congruent Stroop task did not contribute to any significant variance beyond that 
of the active buffer capacity. In the case of latency effects, no relation to Gf was found in any group. 
4. General Discussion 
To sum up the results (see Figure 1), when (a) the antisaccade and Stroop tasks were designed so that scores on 
these tasks were relatively unaffected by the individual differences in STM, and (b) these differences were sta- 
tistically controlled for, the previously substantial Gf variance uniquely predicted by attention control (14.7% in 
the case of the standard antisaccade task in Study 1), either largely decreased (to 4.1% in the case of the mod- 
ified antisaccade task in Study 1) or even diminished (1% in the case of the modified 75%-congruent Stroop task 
in Study 2). On the contrary, the part of Gf variance uniquely explained by the active buffer capacity was con- 
stantly substantial, and it reached 23.7% in Study 2. Moreover, the experimental manipulation of Study 1 dimi- 
nishing the contribution of the STM task to the antisaccade task suggests that there are good reasons to believe 
that the part of Gf variance jointly explained by both these tasks was shared due to their common load on sto- 
rage mechanisms and not a load on attention control. 
Although using only one attention control task in each study instead of calculating a latent variable from sev- 
eral tasks may be seen as a limitation of the present research, the use of one task and one experimental manipu- 
lation in each study was intended, in order to interpret the results more clearly. Other attention control tests, like 
psychomotor vigilance task, correlate with Gf even more weakly (Unsworth et al., 2009) than each of the tasks 
examined here, so taking the former into account should not have changed the conclusions of this study. 
The present results seem to pose some problems for the executive-attention theory of fluid intelligence, and at 
least they suggest that if attention control mechanisms indeed contribute to fluid intelligence, they are not the 
sole nor the primary contributor. On the contrary, the results suggest that the primary factor related to Gf is the 
active buffer capacity, while attention control in even such an attentionally demanding test as the antisaccade 
task contributes to only a moderate part of individual differences in fluid ability, when the influence of STM is 
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Figure 1. The amounts of variance in fluid reasoning uniquely and jointly explained by attention control (boxes on the left) 
and STM tasks (boxes on the right), in Studies 1 and 2. Panel A: data from the experimental group who fulfilled the variant 
of the antisaccade task yielding low storage load, thus sensitive to individual differences in STM. Panel B: data from the 
group who fulfilled the variant of the antisaccade task yielding high storage load, thus insensitive to individual differences in 
STM. Panel C: data from the group who fulfilled the variant of the Stroop task yielding minimal storage load, thus insensi- 
tive to individual differences in STM.                                                                       
 
controlled for. In the latter regard, these results are consistent with data from Schweizer (2010), who estimated 
that only a few percent of Gf variance can be explained by attention control. A little higher such an estimation 
was presented by Cowan et al. (2006), who found that 10% of Gf variance was uniquely predicted by the atten- 
tion control task, and another 12% was shared with the STM task. However, Cowan et al. used a small sample 
(52 adults) as well as a disputable measure of control (the correct recall of unattended versus attended stimuli), 
so Schweizer’s as well as mine few-percent-variance estimation of attention control contribution to Gf may lay 
closer to the real value. At the same time, the active buffer capacity may contribute to between ten and twenty 
percent of Gf variance at least. 
The presented results are particularly important because they directly test the frequent assumptions made by 
proponents of the executive-attention theory on the reliance of fluid reasoning on attentional control capabilities. 
Although there is scarce evidence that measures of attention control can be predictors of Gf as strong as the sto- 
rage measures (except for the cited paper by Cowan et al., 2006), numerous authors have referred to such a hy- 
pothesis, and interpreted the activation of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) in both attention control tasks and reason- 
ing tests as the argument for linking attentional control with Gf (for reviews see Burgess, Gray, Conway, & 
Braver, 2011; Kane & Engle, 2002). However, as long as what processes take place in various structures of PFC 
is not understood precisely, such an indirect argumentation may not be so strong as intended. Likely, the view 
on the role of WM in complex cognition is more complicated, and various components of WM play different 
roles see (Conway, Getz, Macnamara, & Engel de Abreu, 2011). 
However, does the fact that attention control does not contribute so importantly to fluid ability indicate that, 
generally, executive control is not necessary for fluid reasoning? Surely, such a conclusion cannot be drawn on 
the basis of the presented study. Another control process different from attention control which can explain 
some part of variance in reasoning may rely on the control of interference between competing solutions related 
to a reasoning task. For example, studies on cross-mapping in analogy-making show that it is very difficult to 
choose a perceptually/semantically improbable mapping, even if it properly fits the structure of analogy (i.e., it 
is the correct mapping), and to ignore a perceptually/semantically consistent but structurally misfitting mapping 
(Cho, Holyoak, & Cannon, 2007; Chuderska & Chuderski, 2014; Markman & Gentner, 1993). Maybe, Gf-unre- 
lated (attention) control over perceptual-motor entities, like salient but irrelevant stimuli or prepotent but im- 
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proper responses, should be conceptually distinguished from Gf-related control over internal cognitive processes 
aimed at regulating the flow of thoughts, the retrieval of semantically-rich representations, the construction of 
new informational structures, etc. (for an example of such a distinction see Nigg, 2000). It seems unlikely that 
the latter control can be tapped by such simple performance tests as the antisaccade task or the Stroop, while it 
may still be crucial for successful performance in various tests of relatively more complex cognition. Obviously, 
more work is needed in future for a fuller understanding of the role of such control processes in cognition 
(MacLeod, 2007; Morrison, Doumas, & Richland, 2010). 
5. Conclusion 
In conclusion, both the reviewed and presented data as well as the theoretical considerations suggest that out of 
two crucial mechanisms of WM, attention control, understood as the capability of focusing attention on the cur- 
rent goal/task-set and blocking interference/distraction, and measured with two most widely used tasks, contri- 
butes to fluid intelligence to a lesser extent than does the active buffer of WM, which is responsible for active 
maintenance of several chunks of information for the purpose of the current task/goal. Thus, the present study 
provides significant knowledge about which WM mechanisms (i.e., the active buffer) primarily determine WM 
functioning as well as its role in higher-level cognitive processes, and which WM mechanisms (i.e., attention 
control) may have less influence on both these characteristics of WM. 
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